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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found Robert Johnson Kinney guilty of one count of
felony sexual battery of a minor.  Mr. Kinney appealed, asserting the district court erred when it
failed to dismiss the charge against him on proportionality grounds, because the restrictions
imposed on Mr. Kinney by the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-
to-Know Act, I.C. §§ 18-8301 to 18-8331 (the Act or SORA), constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Kinney has not shown Idaho precedent
should be overturned, and has not established SORA constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
(See Resp. Br., pp.5-22.)
The Reply Brief is necessary to address certain of the State’s arguments on whether
SORA is punitive.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Kinney’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE




The District Court Erred When It Failed To Dismiss The Charge Against Mr. Kinney On
Proportionality Grounds
A. Introduction
Mr. Kinney asserts the district court erred when it failed to dismiss the charge against him
on proportionality grounds.  Contrary to the district court’s determination, as well as the State’s
arguments on appeal, Idaho’s SORA violates the United States and Idaho constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.  The Act is punitive, and the previous
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court holding otherwise are manifestly wrong and should be
overturned.  The punishment imposed by the Act is cruel and unusual, because it is grossly
disproportionate to Mr. Kinney’s offense.
B. Idaho’s SORA Violates The Constitutional Prohibitions Against Cruel And Unusual
Punishment
Mr. Kinney asserts Idaho’s SORA violates the constitutional prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishment.  The restrictions imposed by the Act constitute punishment, and those
Idaho Supreme Court decisions holding the Act is not punitive are manifestly wrong and should
be overturned.  The punishment imposed by SORA in this case is grossly disproportionate to
Mr. Kinney’s offense.
1. SORA Is Punitive
Mr. Kinney asserts SORA is punitive. See Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir.
2016). Mr. Kinney acknowledges the Idaho Supreme Court has previously held the Act is not
punitive, see Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 839 (2009); State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75 (2007);
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 100 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
4
U.S. 356 (2010), but asserts those decisions are manifestly wrong and should be overturned.
Mr. Kinney submits that consideration of the five most-relevant factors1 identified in Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), reveals that Idaho’s SORA, much like the Michigan act examined by
the Sixth Circuit in Does #1-5, is now punitive.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State leans on the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court
holding that SORA is not punitive, including State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41 (2011).  (See Resp.
Br., pp.8-9, 12-14.)  The State also relies upon decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals arriving
at  the  same  conclusion.   (See Resp.  Br.,  pp.10-11,  14.)   Rather  than  examine  each  of  the  five
most-relevant  factors  individually,  the  State  appears  to  address  them  as  a  group  when  arguing
that the Act is not punitive.  (See Resp. Br., pp.15-19.)  However, the State’s arguments contain
several flaws.
First,  the  State  is  incorrect  that  the  pertinent  amendments  to  SORA  were  all  added
between 2001 and 2006.  (See Resp. Br., p.15.)  The State argues, “[c]ontrary to [Mr.] Kinney’s
assertions on appeal, the ‘in person’ registration requirement was not added in 2011, but was
added in 2005.”  (Resp. Br., p.15.)  However, the in person registration requirement from 2005
was part of the recodification of a requirement regarding annual registration, as governed by
I.C. § 18-8307(5)(b). See 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 233 § 2.  The requirement to appear in
person regarding the different duty to update registration, as governed by I.C. § 18-8309, was
1 As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (see App. Br., pp.13-14), those factors “are whether, in its
necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a
punishment;  imposes  an  affirmative  disability  or  restraint;  promotes  the  traditional  aims  of
punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to
this purpose.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97.
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added in 2011.2 See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 311 § 9.  Thus, the pertinent amendments to
SORA were not all added between 2001 and 2006.
Additionally,  contrary  to  the  State’s  arguments  (see Resp. Br., p.15), Idaho’s appellate
courts have not addressed all the changes encompassed in the amendments to SORA.  While the
Idaho Supreme Court held in Johnson that “SORA has changed little since this Court considered
it in Ray and since the Court of Appeals considered it in [State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74 (Ct. App.
2005)],” Johnson, 152 Idaho at 45, Johnson suffers from the same infirmities as other post-Ray
decisions.  The analysis in Smith v. State and Joslin was highly indebted to Ray, without really
considering any changes to the Act. See Smith v. State, 146 Idaho at 839; Joslin, 145 Idaho at
86.  In Johnson, the only change analyzed was the change to the legislative findings in the Act;
the Court stated, “[t]he presently codified SORA findings in [the 2011 version of] I.C. § 18-8302
are nearly identical to the [1998] version we evaluated in Ray.” See Johnson, 152 Idaho at 45.
Thus, the Johnson Court did not analyze the 2006 addition of the access to school
grounds restrictions from I.C. § 18-8329, nor did the Court analyze the 2011 version of the
I.C. § 18-8309 duty to update registration information, with its new requirement to appear in
person. See Johnson, 152 Idaho at 45.   The Court of Appeals decided Gragg before those
changes were enacted. See Gragg, 143 Idaho at 465.  Thus, Idaho’s appellate courts have not
addressed all the changes encompassed in the amendments to SORA.
Next,  the State’s discussion of the access to school grounds restrictions from I.C. § 18-
8329 (see Resp. Br., pp.17-18), is unavailing.  The State contends, “there is nothing in this record
on which this Court can base a finding that any geographical restrictions placed on sex offenders
2 Specifically, the duty to update registration requirement to appear in person applies to a
registrant who “changes his or her name, street address or actual address, employment or student
status.”  I.C. § 18-8309(1).
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in Idaho are so burdensome as to constitute punishment.”  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  However, the Idaho
Supreme Court has used research presented in cases from other jurisdictions to support its
holdings.  For example, in State v. Almarez, 154 Idaho 584 (2013), the Court noted, “[t]he New
Jersey Supreme Court recently undertook a very thorough examination of the current state of
scientific research regarding eyewitness identifications and concluded that ‘[t]he research . . . is
not only extensive,’ but ‘it represents the gold standard in terms of the applicability of social
science research to the law.’” Almarez, 154 Idaho at 593 (quoting State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872, 916 (N.J. 2011)) (some internal quotation marks omitted).  The Almarez Court stated, “[w]e
agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court and find that this extensive research convincingly
demonstrates the fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony and pinpoints an array of
variables that are most likely to lead to a mistaken identification.” Id.
Thus, by analogy to Almarez, the Court could use the research discussed in Does #1-5,
including  the  map and  empirical  studies  relied  upon by  the  Sixth  Circuit  in  that  case, see 834
F.3d at 701-02, 704-05, to hold the access to school grounds restrictions and other restrictions
imposed by SORA are now punitive in effect.
Also, much like I.C. § 18-8329, the Michigan act in Does #1-5 contained exceptions to its
general prohibition against sexual offender registrants being allowed onto school grounds. See
Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 698.  Those exceptions were similar to the exceptions in Section 18-8329.
Compare Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.734 to 28.736, with I.C.  §  18-8329(2).   The  Sixth  Circuit
nonetheless held the geographical restrictions in the Michigan act were “very burdensome,” and
that the Michigan act “resembles, in some respects at least, the ancient punishment of
banishment.” See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 701-02.
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In spite of the State’s flawed arguments, the actual effect of Idaho’s current SORA is
punitive. See id. at 705.  Mr. Kinney submits that he has shown by the “clearest proof” that the
Act in fact inflicts punishment. See  Smith  v.  Doe,  538  U.S.  at  92.   In  light  of  the  changes  to
SORA since 1999 that have made it punitive, Ray and  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court’s  post-Ray
decisions on whether the Act is punitive are manifestly wrong and should be overturned.
2. The Punishment Imposed By SORA Is Cruel And Unusual
Mr. Kinney asserts the punishment imposed by the Act in his case is cruel and unusual.
The State argues, “[e]ven if this Court decides that the long line of Idaho cases holding that the
registration requirements of Idaho’s SORA are non-punitive should be overturned, requiring
[Mr.] Kinney to register under Idaho’s SORA does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”
(Resp. Br., p.19.)  Because the State’s argument on this point is unremarkable, no further reply is
necessary.  Accordingly, Mr. Kinney would refer the Court to pages 22 to 26 of the
Appellant’s Brief.3
3 In a footnote, the State contends, “[e]ven if the registration requirements of SORA were found
to be unconstitutional [Mr.] Kinney does not explain why such a finding would entitle him to a
dismissal of the charge.  [Mr.] Kinney does not argue on appeal that the crime, Idaho Code § 18-
1508A, itself is unconstitutional.  Any potential remedy for an [unconstitutional] punishment
would not involve the dismissal of the charge.”  (Resp. Br., p.19 n.5.)
Assuming  the  remedy  of  dismissing  the  charge  were  not  available,  Mr.  Kinney  would
submit the alternative remedy he requested in the motion to reconsider would still be available;
namely, that the Court “hold I.C. § 18-8306 unconstitutional as it applies to this case and
therefore not order the defendant to register or that his information be collected by law
enforcement or submitted to the Idaho State Police and the central registry.”  (See R., pp.155-56.)
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CONCLUSION
For  the  above  reasons,  as  well  as  the  reasons  contained  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,
Mr. Kinney respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s orders denying his
Motion to Dismiss on Proportionality Grounds and his Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss
on Proportionality Grounds, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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